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SOOD

BIASES BEHIND SEXUAL ASSAULT:
A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SOLUTION TO
UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF THE RAPE OF BLACK
WOMEN

REEMA SOOD*

INTRODUCTION
Devaluation of Black women’s bodies derives from the long history of slavery in this country.1 The treatment of Black women, from
slavery to the present, ties closely to the systemic tactics of oppression
utilized by White slave owners after our country’s founding.2 In removing autonomy and control over Black female slaves’ bodies, slave owners ensured that any offspring borne from the rape of a Black slave
would become indoctrinated into slavery.3 Though Congress provided
options to remedy the unconscionable, disparate treatment of the races
by passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,4 the broad “badges and incidents” of slavery persist,5 coloring the
treatment of Black women many years after abolition.
Sexual assault deeply affects victims, changing their lives forever. Scholars have written that rape “breaks the spirit, humiliates,
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We stand together.
1 See infra Part II.
2 See infra Part II-A.
3 Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2006).
4 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 431–32 (1968) (discussing Senator Trumbull’s desire to pass a more “sweeping and efficient” bill after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, specifically one to “give[s] effect” to the declaration that all persons should be
free) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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tames, [and] produces a docile, deferential, obedient soul.”6 Rape degrades,7 oppresses,8 and instills fear.9 It does not relent, as the lingering
effects of rape remain in a victim’s life: “resolution of the trauma is
never final; recovery is never complete.”10 Rape also affects more than
just the victim: It ripples out to entire communities.11 Victims of rape
struggle to heal after the trauma and their connected circles of family
and friends suffer with them.12
Today, sexual assault crimes pose a great threat to the safety and
well-being of Black women. Police and prosecutors both have significant discretionary powers to investigate these crimes.13 Unfortunately,
implicit, unconscious biases plague our criminal justice system and in
turn adversely affect law enforcement’s handling of sexual assault
crimes.14 Black women in particular suffer the consequences of law enforcement’s discretionary power15 and have historically been victimized
by law enforcement.16 Crimes against Black women are poorly

6

SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE
AMERICA 11 (2015) (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Weapon of War, 11 HYPATIA 5, 6 (1996)).
7 Id.
8 See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 18 (1981) (“Rape was a
common method of torture slavers used to subdue recalcitrant black women.”); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the “undervaluation of all rape offenses against Black
women”).
9 ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 7 (Duke
Univ. Press 2015) (2005) (“Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation
by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”) (quoting SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (Fawcett Books 1993) (1975)).
10 DEER, supra note 6, at 12 (quoting JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 211 (Basic Books
1992).
11 Id. at 109.
12 Id. at 10.
13 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 15 (1998).
14 Id. at 16 (“At every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that African Americans are
not treated as well as whites – both as victims of crime and as criminal defendants.”). See Pokorak, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing the “serious impact on the nature of prosecution” juror biases
and stereotypes have on prosecutorial discretion because of the “prosecutors’ downstream orientation and system outcome bias”).
15 See Michelle S. Jacobs, The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police
Violence, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39, 41 (2017) (“Black women’s interaction with the
state, through law enforcement, is marked by violence.”).
16 See generally ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK
WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017) (offering a detailed examination of police violence
against Black women and LGBTQ people of color).

SOOD

2018]

BIASES BEHIND SEXUAL ASSAULT

407

investigated and sometimes ignored altogether.17 When police actually
attempt to investigate alleged crimes against Black women, they often
believe the victims are not credible.18 Further, the few sexual assault
crimes that actually lead to police charges are frequently not pursued by
prosecutors.19 Whether the disparity arises from unconscious or intentional biases, it inflicts harm on Black women by denying them access
to justice.
Part II traces the history of this country’s degradation of Black
women’s bodies and assesses how historical abuses continue to shape
the experiences of Black women with respect to the full enjoyment of
their rights as enshrined in the Thirteenth Amendment,20 the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.21 Part III outlines the Thirteenth
Amendment22 as the best method for addressing oppression23 and control over Black bodies because of the Amendment’s historical grounding and its unburdened status compared to the Fourteenth Amendment.24
It further connects the Thirteenth Amendment with the history of depriving Black women the fundamental human right to bodily autonomy.25 Part III-C addresses the seminal Supreme Court decisions that
initially limited the viability of Thirteenth Amendment arguments, including the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson.26 Part III-D outlines the Amendment’s practical implementation and resurrection in the
courts, making particular use of the 1968 decision Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer, Co.27 to show how critical the Amendment can be in the fight to
protect the lives, safety, and rights of Black women.28 Part IV presents
potential remedies, including: (1) a call to action for practicing attorneys
to implement Thirteenth Amendment arguments and increase their
See RITCHIE, supra note 16; Kali Holloway, When You’re a Black Woman, You’re Never
Good Enough to Be a Victim, JEZEBEL (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:40 PM), https://jezebel.com/whenyoure-a-black-woman-youre-never-good-enough-to-be-1633065554 (“For black women who
are raped, misogyny and racism often conspire to make victim an unattainable status.”).
18 Jacobs, supra note 15, at 49 (discussing the legal system’s “unwillingness to find Black
women credible”).
19 Davis, supra note 13, at 15–16.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
21 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1991)); see infra Part II.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
23 See Douglas L. Colbert, Affirming the Thirteenth Amendment, 1995 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 403, 403 (1995).
24 See infra Part III.
25 Id.
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27 329 U.S. 409 (1968).
28 See infra Part III-D.
17
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prominence in jurisprudence, (2) options for Congress to create laws
intended to resolve discriminatory treatment of sexual violence against
Black women, and (3) the option for Black women to seek civil tort
actions as a means of redress.29
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE
DEVALUATION OF BLACK WOMEN
A. Rape as a Tool to Dehumanize Black Slaves
To adequately understand the plight of Black women in our present-day context, we must pay particular attention to the way that Black
women were treated during slavery.30 Although our society, as well as
our judicial system, seeks comfort in the false premise that it achieved
fairness and equal opportunity with the abolition of slavery,31 the vile
constriction of the institution persists through intentional and unintentional biases against Black women.
White slave owners’ treatment of Black slaves had few boundaries.32 In fact, for much of history, raping a Black woman was not criminalized.33 Masters raped and brutalized Black women without any legal
recompense, furthering their own economic interests by increasing their
number of slaves as the women gave birth to children of forcible rape.34
One slave recounted:
He told me I was his property, that I must be subject to
his will in all things . . . . No matter whether the slave
girl be as black as ebony or as fair as her mistress, in
either case there is no shadow of law to protect her from
insult, violence, or even death.35

29

See infra Part IV.
See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 18, 20 (2004) (discussing racial profiling as a product of
slavery in the United States).
31 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1181,
1198 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s tendency to “ignor[e] all aspects of American history”
in the context of racial profiling) (emphasis in original).
32 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8–9.
33 Id. at 6; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35.
34 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 10; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 16.
35 RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 28.
30
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Many slave owners had easy access to vulnerable female slaves;
they frequently forced young Black girls to sleep in the same bedroom
as themselves.36 Although Black women were attacked and demoralized
by their White masters, in turn increasing White male power and
wealth,37 White women failed to assist Black women because some felt
resentment over their husbands’ attention.38
These repugnant acts to dehumanize Black women continued for
more than two centuries with a number of false justifications, including
the lower status of Black people and a false narrative of Black sexual
promiscuity.39 As further rationalization for their actions, White slave
owners began to characterize Black women as sexually lascivious and
lewd.40 Black women were portrayed as so inherently enticing that
White slave owners could not be held accountable for their actions.41 In
systematically raping their female slaves, White masters achieved two
goals: increase their power and dehumanize their property.42 “[T]he
right claimed by slaveowners . . . over the bodies of female slaves was
a direct expression of their presumed property rights over Black people
as a whole.”43
Subjugation hardens and denigrates people.44 The mentality of
White slave owners created a lasting stereotype of Black women that
contributes to their disparate treatment.45 The systematic rape of Black
slaves remains relevant to our present-day understanding of the problems facing Black women as the biases and judgments embedded themselves in modern consciousness.46

36

HOOKS, supra note 8, at 25.
Id. at 16.
38 Id. at 36.
39 Id. at 36–37.
40 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 9.
41 Id. at 9–10.
42 Id. at 10.
43 RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 27–28.
44 Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves, 13 MASS.
REV. 81, 98 (1972) (“An intricate and savage web of oppression intruded at every moment into
the black woman’s life during slavery. Yet a single theme appears at every juncture: the woman
transcending, refusing, fighting back, asserting herself over and against terrifying obstacles.”);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Some Women Won’t ‘Ever Again’ Report a Rape in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/us/baltimore-police-sexual-assault-gender-bias.html.
45 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 53.
46 Michelle S. Jacobs, 2018 Special Issue: Enhancing Women’s Effect on law Enforcement in
the Age of Police and Protest: The Violence State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against
37
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Dred Scott v. Sandford serves as the quintessential starting point
for an in-depth analysis of the disparate treatment of Black women in
sexual assault crimes.47 Dred Scott, widely condemned as an anti-canonical case,48 cemented racist public sentiment in the law and sent a
firm message that Black people were an “inferior class of beings” to
Whites.49 According to the Court, Black people historically had “no
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”50 The decision, tactically written by Justice Roger B. Taney and cloaked in an originalist
interpretation of the meaning of the word “citizen” in the Constitution,51
further institutionalized racist ideology. The opinion ignored the unique
experience of Black women and discussed the status of the Black race.52
Still, the Court denied Black women personhood, increasing the severity
of their historical oppression.53 The effect of Dred Scott persists in the
unfair treatment of Black women as they still struggle to obtain personhood.54 Lawyers have an obligation to work to correct the bitter dregs
of Dred Scott55 and provide Black women with the security in their own
person promised to every person in this country.56
Although White male assault on Black females critically impacted their experience throughout history, Black women also faced
subjugation by Black men.57 The rape of Black women by other slaves

Police Violence, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 39, 46–47, 51–52, 63–64
(2018).
47 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
48 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.KENT L. REV. 49, 76 (2006) (“Dred Scott is the key example in [the] anti-canon.”).
49 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405.
50 Id. at 407.
51 Id. at 406–07.
52 Id.
53 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 38–39 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978).
54 Patricia A. Broussard, Black Women’s Post-Slavery Silence Syndrome: A Twenty-First
Century Remnant of Slavery, Jim Crow, and Systematic Racism – Who Will Tell Her Stories?,
16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 401–02, 420–21 (2013) (explaining Black women’s struggle
to obtain personhood).
55 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393.
56 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1991)) (providing that citizens of “every race and color” shall have the same right to the
“full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property”).
57
Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8; HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35 (citing EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 33 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (“Even when a
black man sexually attacked a black woman, he could only be punished by his master, no way
existed to bring him to trial or to convict him if so brought.”).

SOOD

2018]

BIASES BEHIND SEXUAL ASSAULT

411

was not criminalized.58 In George v. State of Mississippi,59 the Supreme
Court of Mississippi overturned a rape conviction of a Black male slave
and held that he could not be guilty of raping a Black female slave because it was not illegal.60 At that time, a male slave could only commit
rape of White women.61 As an unfortunate consequence of decisions
like Dred Scott and George, the legality of the assault of Black
women,62 along with the skewed justifications for assault,63 persist in
today’s society as unconscious and unintentional biases that color how
the public views rape crimes against Black women.64
B. Congressional Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil
Rights Act of 1866
The Congressional Debates regarding the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act (the “Act”) provide critical context
for understanding the broad scope interpretation of the Amendment.65
Referencing the debates, Justice Stewart once stated that the 34th Congress intended for the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to be
broad and sweeping.66 Congress passed the Act as the first exercise of
its Thirteenth Amendment, § 2 power.67 Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, a strong proponent of the broad interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment, asserted that the Act strived to “break down all discrimination between black men and white men.”68 Further, Senator Trumbull
believed that additional laws needed to be passed to stop the apparent
problem of public biases furthering the oppression of Black people.69
The 34th Congress intended the Act to forbid several forms of racial
discrimination.70

58

Pokorak, supra note 3, at 8.
George v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (Miss. Ct. App. 1859).
60 Id. at 317, 320. See Erin Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist
Perspective on the Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 43, 49 (1992) (“The
rape of a Black woman by any man was not a crime.”).
61
HOOKS, supra note 8, at 35 (citing EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE 33 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972)).
62 Id. at 35.
63 Id. at 16.
64 See infra Section II-C for a discussion on the modern treatment of Black women.
65 Carter, supra note 30, at 72.
66 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 429 (1968).
67 Colbert, supra note 23, at 404.
68
Jones, 392 U.S. at 432.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 435.
59
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The Thirteenth Amendment allowed Congress to pass the Act.71
The Amendment presents a powerful implement to address sexual violence against Black women because it allows Congress to identify lingering effects of slavery and enact legislation to remedy those effects.72
The broad language and scope of the Act provides an example of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s power.73 The Amendment was intended to
guarantee freedom,74 not in a restrictive sense limited to freedom from
slavery, but instead in a broad sense that addressed all vestiges of slavery.75 At the time of enactment, members of Congress held the view that
the Act should be interpreted broadly.76 Congressional debates on the
Thirteenth Amendment showed vast support for the use of the Thirteenth Amendment to address systemic, ongoing inequities stemming
from slavery.77
Many pro-slavery citizens reacted poorly to the progressive
changes of Congress in 1865, unwilling to allow former slaves to enjoy
equal status under the law.78 Nonetheless, drafters and supporters of the
Amendment viewed it as necessary because the abolition of slavery
could not alone create true equality among the races. 79 This framing of
the Thirteenth Amendment provides ample understanding of its intended use. Congress planned for a Constitutional provision that had the
power to address any incidents or vestiges of slavery.80 With such wide
reach, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a powerful and “under-utilized”81 remedy, including against the institutionalized dismissal of sexual assault crimes against Black women.
C. Present-Day Issue: Under-Policing and Under-Prosecution of
Sexual Assault Crimes Against Black Women

See U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the “power to enforce” the abolition of
slavery by “appropriate legislation”).
72 See Carter, supra note 30, at 20 (noting that the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the
Thirteenth Amendment” is meant to be used to “eliminate the lingering effects of the slave system”).
73 Jones, 392 U.S. at 426–27.
74 Colbert, supra note 23, at 403.
75 Carter, supra note 30, at 48.
76 Id.
77 Jones, 392 U.S. at 431.
78 Pokorak, supra note 3, at 16.
79 Id. at 17.
80 Jones, 392 U.S. at 429.
81 Colbert, supra note 23, at 405.
71
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The hyper-sexualized stereotype of Black women that began
during slavery82 continues to exist and affects Black women’s personhood. The self-assuring rationale used to justify White slave owners’
systematic subjugation of Black women remains a modern-day vestige.83 Further, Black women sit at the intersection of their race and gender, subject to “overlapping systems of subordination.”84 As a result,
Black women have not historically been granted the same level of attention that White women have received following sexual assaults.85 Public
perception of race and rape can affect the extent of police investigations.86 Statistics regarding the rape of Black women are flawed due to
low rates of reporting,87 but existing statistics are revealing. The U.S.
Department of Justice released a report in 2013 compiling rape statistics
that showed Black women suffered from attacks at a rate of 2.8 per 1000
whereas White women were attacked at a rate of 2.2 per 1000.88
Although the existing statistics reflect a slight disparity,89 they
are difficult to rely upon due to severe issues with underreporting.90 In
some cases, low reporting may result from a distrust of police.91 Many
82

HOOKS, supra note 8, at 36–37; Pokorak, supra note 3, at 9.
See Pokorak, supra note 3, at 10 (detailing the justifications used by slave owners to abuse
Black women).
84 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244, 1265 (1991). In her piece, Crenshaw
offers the example of the Central Park jogger, a White woman who was sexually assaulted in
1989. Other rapes occurred in the same week in New York, including a violent gang rape of a
Black woman. While the Central Park jogger splashed headlines, women of color were not
granted the same level of the public’s sympathy. Id. at 1268.
85 Id. at 1268.
86 See e.g. Toni Irving, Decoding Black Women: Policing Practices and Rape Prosecution on
the Streets of Philadelphia, 20 NWSA J. 100 (2008) (discussing how black women are “generally displaced as victims of rape” and examining the way “personal narratives of rape victims
are structured by competing and overwhelming sociolegal narratives that undercut their reception”); Vicki McNickle Rose & Susan Carol Randall, The Impact of Investigator Perceptions of
Victim Legitimacy on the Processing of Rape/Sexual Assault Cases, 5 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
23 (1982) (examining the “interpretive process in which police investigators engage as they
construct certain types of victim and case characterizations”).
87 See Callie Marie Rennison, Rape and Sexual Assault: Reporting to Police and Medical Attention, 1992-2000, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2 (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf (“Most rapes and sexual assaults were not reported to the police.”).
88 MICHAEL P LANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 240655, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, 1994-2010 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf.
89 Id.
90 Id. Of particular note in the DOJ report is the alarming statistic that American Indian women
are raped at a rate of 4.5 per 1000 people. Id. The reported statistic is marked as cautionary as
the statistic is either based on fewer than 10 cases or has a variation above 50%, so the conclusion may not be reliable. Id.
91 Taslitz, supra note 31, at 1190.
83
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Black women struggle to trust police due to a history of unfair treatment,
including being coerced into sexual favors to avoid criminal charges92
or even sexually assaulted outright.93 Black women may feel less comfortable approaching police officers after being attacked than White
women, resulting in lower than accurate statistics on total rapes perpetrated against Black women.94
In 2015, the Department of Justice concluded a lengthy investigation of Baltimore City for numerous unconstitutional and unacceptable practices, including grossly inadequate investigation of rape allegations.95 The federal report focused on the Baltimore City Police
Department and the many instances in which the department derisively
disregarded forcible rape allegations made by women in the predominantly African American city.96 In one instance cited in the report, when
a victim attempted to discuss her case with a Baltimore City police officer, he challenged her by asking, “Why are you messing that guy’s life
up?”97 According to the DOJ investigation, the city police officer rejected the victim’s claims and focused instead on how the alleged rapist’s life would be affected rather than recognizing the immense difficulties of her attack.98 Another officer in the Baltimore Police
Department indicated that “all [their] cases were bullshit.”99 In addition
to the inadequacy of police officers’ investigations, many rape kits sit
untested, even though they contain evidence gathered through invasive
physical examinations of victims immediately after traumatic attacks.100
Of all the rape kits collected, fewer than one fifth actually get tested.101
92

Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 44.
See generally RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 106–26 (detailing specific instances of sexual violence perpetrated by police officers against women and LGBTQ people of color).
94 See id. (discussing why Black women may feel less comfortable approaching police officers).
See also Taslitz, supra note 31, at 1190 (detailing how 65.8% of Black people indicated they
had low confidence that police would treat them the same as white people and five times as
many Black people reported mistreatment at the hand of police officers than White people).
95 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 122–
27 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [hereinafter Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department]
96 Id. at 122 (noting that BPD detectives ask questions “suggesting that they discredit the reports
of victims who delay” in reporting and display “undue skepticism of reports of sexual assault”);
Quick Facts: Baltimore city, Maryland (County), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/baltimorecitymarylandcounty#qf-flag-NA (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (indicating that the percentage of Black people living in Baltimore City is 63%).
97 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 95, at 122.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 123–24.
101 Id. at 124.
93
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These rape kits can implicate any number of prior offenders with DNA
currently in the system or point to new suspects, but city police leave
them sitting untested.102 The findings by the Department of Justice revealed that the police treated the claims of women in the 63% African
American city103 as invalid and not credible.104 By simple inference, the
majority105 of the untested rape kits were collected from Black women
and went to waste.
Not only did the Department of Justice find the Baltimore City
Police Department’s investigative practices well below constitutional
standards, it also cited multiple examples of ineptitude on the part of
city prosecutors.106 Prosecutors laughed with police officers about
claims of sexual assault reported by city women.107 In one instance, a
city prosecutor discussed a case with the arresting officer, complaining
that he was “not excited about charging it” and that the victim “seemed
like a conniving little whore.”108 The disregard, disdain, and incredulity
towards women’s reports of sexual assault in a majority Black city109
create an almost palpable affirmation that Black women are second class
citizens, if they are considered citizens at all. The police department’s
routine under-investigation of sexual assaults110 cripples victims’ ability
to get justice for serious crimes in a majority Black city and demonstrates deep ties to the historical treatment of Black women. If society
harbors the belief that Black women are inherently lustful and incapable
of being raped,111 then it follows that police officers and prosecutors
102

Id.
See Stolberg and Bidgood, supra note 44; Quick Facts: Baltimore City, Maryland, supra
note 96.
104 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 95, at 122–23.
105 See Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 44 (noting that from 2010-2014, rape kits were tested
in only 15% of Baltimore sexual assault cases).
106 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 95, at 122.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 124–25.
110 See id. at 123 (“[The Baltimore City Police Department] seriously and systematically underinvestigates reports of sexual assault . . . .”).
111
BARRETT J. FOERSTER, RACE, RAPE, AND INJUSTICE: DOCUMENTING AND CHALLENGING
DEATH PENALTY CASES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 77 (Michael Meltsner ed., 2012). Although the
book primarily focuses on the struggle of Black men in their own White rape narrative, it outlines a case study in Alabama that proves helpful in understanding the disparate outcomes of
cases with Black victims. In 1964, seventeen counties in Alabama were surveyed. In 130 rape
cases with a Black male defendant, the death sentence was used twenty-one times. In sixty-two
rape cases with White defendants, only one resulted in a death sentence. None of the victims in
any of the twenty-two cases resulting in death sentences were Black women. In the seventy
103
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would also have a hard time believing a Black woman who states she
was attacked. Police officers would then feel less inclined to investigate
sexual assault crimes against Black women, leading to unfair outcomes
in the justice system.112
A particularly disturbing scenario arises when members of law
enforcement leverage their position of authority to target Black women
in sexual assaults.113 Daniel Holtzclaw, a part White, part Asian-American police officer from Oklahoma City strategically targeted Black
women from a low-income neighborhood in a series of sexual assaults.114 Mr. Holtzclaw deliberately sought Black women, some with
criminal backgrounds, who he believed were less likely to receive help
should they report his despicable actions.115 A victim stated, “I didn’t
think nobody was going to believe me anyway . . . . I’m a drug addict.”116 The prosecutor in the case against Mr. Holtzclaw stated, “He
counted on the fact no one would believe them and no one would
care.”117 Black women are in the unfortunate and unjust position of being targeted by attackers who seek to exploit their societal vulnerabilities to avoid prosecution. Moreover, members of the police force, agencies meant to protect and serve the citizens of the United States, know
that Black women routinely do not receive justice for sexual assault
crimes perpetrated against them and have, in some shameful cases, used
that knowledge to orchestrate further victimization.118 Vestiges of slavery persist and Black women are continuously dehumanized through
both these deliberate actions and through subtle biases.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

cases with Black female victims studied, there were no death sentences ordered. Cases involving
the rape of White women resulted 22-25% of the time in a death sentence. Id.
112 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 95, at 122–27.
113
See generally RITCHIE, supra note 16 (detailing police violence against Black women and
LGBTQ people). “In the past decade a law enforcement official was caught in a case of sexual
abuse or misconduct at least every five days.” Id. at 109.
114 Ben Fenwick & Alan Schwarz, In Rape Case of Oklahoma Officer, Victims Hope Conviction
Will Aid Cause, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/us/danielholtzclaw-oklahoma-police-rape-case.html.
115 Dave Philipps, Former Oklahoma City Police Officer Found Guilty of Rapes, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/former-oklahoma-city-police-officer-found-guilty-of-rapes.html; see RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 105–08 (discussing the
Holtzclaw case and its implications).
116
RITCHIE, supra note 16, at 107 (quoting a victim identified by the initials T.M.).
117 Philipps, supra note 115.
118 Id. (noting that Holtzclaw “singl[ed] out poor, black victims with criminal backgrounds
whose stories would not be believed”).
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A. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment constitutes a broad method for
fighting long-held, deeply-rooted injustices against Black people.119
The Amendment, broken into two sections, states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.120
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.121
Drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment intended it be used to remedy
many of the societal maladies left after slavery.122 In fact, Abraham Lincoln equated the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to securing and
safeguarding the rights intended in the Declaration of Independence.123
The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment,124 the Enabling
Clause, grants Congress the broad power to create legislation rectifying
any remaining badges or incidents of slavery.125 This power allows Congress to remedy any ongoing race-based social disparities actualized
during slavery that inhibit the rights of Black people, including the right
to be secure in your own person.126
Denying Black women their right to be secure in their own
person bears a strong connection to the treatment of Black women
throughout our nation's history.127 Over 150 years after the abolition of
slavery, Black women continue to be subjected to assault at higher
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Carter, supra note 30, at 20.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
122 See discussion supra Section II-B.
123 DONALD LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION, RACE, AND RENEWED RELEVANCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT:
RECLAIMING THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF FEDERALISM 41 (2008).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
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Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
126 See generally id. (recognizing broad Congressional authority to cure race-based social disparities).
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rates than White women.128 Congress created the Thirteenth
Amendment to rectify unjust treatment nurtured by the bonds of
slavery.129 The Thirteenth Amendment provides an opportunity for
Congress to repair the ills surrounding slavery130 and the
disproportionate attack of Black women, maintained throughout the
centuries, constitutes a surviving malignancy that our judicial system
needs to resolve. The first legislation passed using Congress’ Enabling
Clause powers helps one understand the Thirteenth Amendment as an
option for combating racial injustice.131 Key decisions, including the
Civil Rights Cases, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer,
Co., provide further insight as to how the Thirteenth Amendment
should be used to aid Black women.132
B. The 1866 Civil Rights Act
The first utilization of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866
Civil Rights Act,133 provides a sound example of the 34th Congress’
intentions.134 Presently, the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is
codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982.135 Of particular significance is
the phrase contained within both the original Civil Rights Act and §
1981, “the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person.”136 This section specifies a right intended to be
protected by the Act: the right to the security of one’s person.137 The
high rate of sexual assault against Black women stands in direct
128

PLANTY ET AL., supra note 88.
See discussion supra Section II-B.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
131 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
132 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
133 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 states: “That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens . . . .” Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
134 Colbert, supra note 22, at 404.
135
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2016).
136 Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1870) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
137 Id.
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opposition of the “security of the person;” our society denies Black
women the basic right of having security in their bodies and the
expectation of safety.138 The plain language of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes this concept of personal security.
Further, personal security is an extension of Congressional intent,
especially in light of the Congressional debates focused on the dangers
to Black citizens.139 As such, it follows that Congress intended for the
Civil Rights Act to cover the continued abuses of Black women.140
C. Early Supreme Court Decisions
Early Supreme Court decisions following the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment initially limited its appeal and departed from the
original intent of the legislature.141 Regardless of the Congressional intent for the Amendment,142 the Supreme Court in the mid to late 1800s
did not view the Thirteenth Amendment as a sweeping tool for remedying the issues surrounding slavery.143 The limiting opinions in the Civil
Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson paint the picture of a Court not yet
willing to act as progressively as the legislature by creating narrow interpretations of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.144
The Civil Rights Cases signified a general acceptance of the theoretical power of the Thirteenth Amendment while simultaneously limiting its scope.145 The majority opinion provided that under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress was empowered to pass laws “necessary
and proper . . . for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its
badges and incidents.”146 Although on its face, this language seems beneficial for a Thirteenth Amendment argument, the Court drew a narrow
interpretation of what truly constituted a badge or incident of slavery.147
For example, the Court would not allow Congress to punish segregated
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id.
141 Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337, 1338
(2009).
142 See Carter, supra note 30, at 48 (noting that “both sides” agreed the “goal of the Amendment
was not limited to the abolition of slavery as an economic institution”).
143 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537-538 (1896).
144 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537-538.
145
Carter, supra note 29, at 52–53.
146 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21; Carter, supra note 30. at 52; Tsesis, supra note 141, at
1341.
147 Carter, supra note 30, at 52.
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private businesses.148 However, in light of Congress’ intended application of the Thirteenth Amendment, it follows that the segregation of
businesses qualifies as a badge and incident of slavery.149 Unfortunately, because the Court chose to limit its scope, the Civil Rights Cases
created a judicial limit on how Congress could expect to utilize the Thirteenth Amendment.150 Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a powerful
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, arguing that Congress should in fact
pass laws against “deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights
granted to other freemen in the same State.”151 His position recalled the
Congressional debates on the Amendment arguing that the majority was
taking a needlessly restrictive view of the Thirteenth Amendment.152 To
Justice Harlan, the context surrounding the particular issue bears tremendous weight.153
The Civil Rights Cases exemplify a missed opportunity of the
Court to prioritize the safety and well-being of Black people. Nonetheless, language in the case, particularly the use of the phrases “necessary
and proper” and “badges and incidents of slavery,”154 continues to add
validity to Thirteenth Amendment arguments. Luckily, the Court’s oppressively limited understanding of what constituted a “badge” of slavery no longer controls in modern jurisprudence.155 Still, the limited interpretation may have had an adverse impact on the capacity of lawyers
at the time to make compelling Thirteenth Amendment arguments.156
Narrow interpretations of the Amendment’s scope may have dissuaded
lawyers across the country from pursuing Thirteenth Amendment arguments due to fears that they would be dismissed by courts.157 Over time,
this restrictive theory of the Thirteenth Amendment’s power and usefulness inhibited the Amendment’s capacity to resolve many of the issues
that pervaded society following slavery.158 Further, the avoidance of the
Amendment as a viable argument continues to occlude the minds of
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Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1341 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
150
Id. at 22; Carter, supra note 30, at 59; Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1338.
151 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152 Id.; Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1339.
153 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 35.
154 Id. at 20.
155 See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (expanding the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment’s application).
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See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (majority) (limiting the potential use of
the Thirteenth Amendment and potentially pushing lawyers to seek other arguments).
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legal students and scholars, decreasing the likelihood of its implementation to fix the many problems it was indeed designed to fix.159
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court again took an unnecessarily
limited stance on what it considered “badges and incidents” of slavery.160 In Plessy, decided in 1896, a man of 1/8 African and 7/8 Caucasian descent rode on a rail car intended for White people only and refused to move when a train conductor tried to relocate him to a coach
intended for Black people.161 The issue in Plessy v. Ferguson was
whether a statute requiring separate but equal railway cars in Louisiana
violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.162 The Court held that segregation on railcars was not an issue that Congress had a right to address through the
Thirteenth Amendment and that the Amendment was only intended to
abolish slavery and not cover the general issues surrounding slavery.163
The theory of the Thirteenth Amendment underlying the Court’s
decision had not changed much since the Civil Rights Cases were decided.164 Again, the Court restricted the concept of the Thirteenth
Amendment to simply constitute an abolition of slavery, rather than the
broad scope interpretation of the Amendment.165 The Plessy Court rejected outright the premise that legislation had the power to resolve social problems between the races.166 According to the majority opinion,
“If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals.”167 The Supreme Court refused to intervene in the relationship between the races and instead felt
ongoing issues between them should be resolved through mutual development and understanding.168
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Colbert, supra note 23, at 411.
Tsesis, supra note 141, at 1342.
161 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541–42 (1896).
162 Id. at 542.
163 Id.
164 Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
165 Id.; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3–4.
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This is a fundamentally unsound proposition.169 The Court chose
to avoid an issue that had already been confronted by the legislature.170
The Court was not charged with creating a statutory solution but simply
interpreting the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment as ratified by the
34th Congress.171 The Plessy Court needed only to heed to Constitutional rule before it. The limited scope theory from the Civil Rights
Cases survived unchanged in Plessy v. Ferguson.172 This unfortunately
compounded the limited interpretation and may have dissuaded the public from utilizing the Thirteenth Amendment to address broad problems.
Although the limited scope theory of the Thirteenth Amendment
survived the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, it was fortunately overturned in the critical modern case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co. in
1968.173 Jones revived the Thirteenth Amendment’s application in modern times, offering it as a viable tool to resolve the issue of the underprosecution of crimes against Black women.174
D. Revitalization of the Thirteenth Amendment Argument
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co. reinvigorated the Thirteenth
Amendment in the modern era.175 Joseph Lee Jones, the Petitioner in the
case before the Supreme Court, alleged that Alfred H. Mayer, Co. had
denied him a home in one of its communities, Paddock Woods in Missouri.176 The Court addressed the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1982
and whether it could be applied to a situation where a private individual
refused to sell a home to a Black citizen solely due to his race. 177 42
U.S.C. § 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by White citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”178 Here, the Court primarily focused on property
rights rather than the security of the person.179 Nonetheless, § 1982
169
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Contra id.
171 Contra id.
172 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52.
173 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
174 Id.
175 Colbert, supra note 22, at 405.
176 Jones, 392 U.S. at 412.
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Id. at 412–13.
178 Id. § 1982 is the current codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in modern applicable
law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2016).
179 Jones, 392 U.S. at 421.
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enshrines a portion of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and therefore it can be
viewed as an interpretation with similar foundational footing.180 In determining whether a White man who refused to sell a home to a Black
man violated the statute, the Court first examined statute’s scope.181 The
Court reasoned that § 1982 had previously been interpreted in Hurd v.
Hodge182 as having a broad scope and was not limited to simply allowing Black people to own property.183 Instead, the statute extended to situations in which individuals were unduly restricted from owning particular property.184 As such, the Court held that the statute applied to the
situation Jones faced.185
Opponents of a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment may make the case that the plain language of the Thirteenth
Amendment indicates it was only intended to end slavery in the United
States.186 However, that interpretation clearly neglects to consider the
drafters’ intent.187 Further, Jones makes a strong case against this interpretation of the language of the Thirteenth Amendment.188 In Jones, Justice Potter Stewart states that if the Thirteenth Amendment were solely
intended to require the states to abolish slavery, then § 2 of the Amendment, which reads, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation,” would be illogical and unnecessary.189 According to Justice Stewart, there would be no need for that section as §
1 of the Amendment sufficiently abolished slavery. 190 Therefore, Congress must have intended for additional legislation to be passed as necessary to resolve the issues surrounding slavery.191
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Id. at 422.
Id. at 417.
182 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
183 Jones, 392 U.S. 418–19 (“[T]he enforcement of those [restrictive] covenants would nonetheless have denied the Negro purchasers the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. That result, this Court concluded, was prohibited by § 1982. To suggest otherwise . . . is to reject the plain meaning of
language.”) (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948)) (internal punctuation omitted).
184 Id. at 419.
185 Id. at 413.
186 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (offering some indication of a broad Thirteenth
Amendment while simultaneously limiting its scope).
187 Jones, 392 U.S. at 423–25.
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189 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
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The theory underlying the Thirteenth Amendment shifted with
Jones back toward Congressional intent for a broad Amendment, creating an opportunity for an argument advocating for the rights of Black
women without judicial restriction.192 Jones provides an opportunity to
finally address the sexual violence perpetrated on Black women.193
Black women are targeted for sexual assaults and are not receiving constitutionally guaranteed support in the criminal justice system. Under
the Thirteenth Amendment, one might argue that the modern treatment
of Black women results from the injustices forced upon them since slavery and push for legislative action aimed at remedying this unfair treatment.194
IV. REMEDIES
Although the situation facing American society regarding the
disparate treatment in sexual assaults of Black women is immense, a
few remedies exist. The Thirteenth Amendment and U.S.C. § 1981,
along with additional laws that should be passed under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provide an opportunity for Congress to embed protections in legislation.195 Black women can also use civil tort remedies
to seek out some restitution for these attacks.196 These options establish
a plan to address the violence against Black women and rectify a painful
aspect of their historical oppression and devaluation. Nothing can erase
history and experience, but these options may provide some relief.

A. Legislation
With the Thirteenth Amendment and the current codification of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act within 42 U.S.C. § 1981, some protections for
Black women already exist in legislation.197 These doctrines, already
enshrined in our current law, allow a sufficient means of pursuing a
claim based on the immoral under-enforcement of rape of Black
women.198 Women who have been attacked and who have not had the
crimes against them adequately investigated should file suit against the
government asserting that this unfair treatment is in violation of the
192
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Thirteenth Amendment, or alternatively, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981, created under the powers granted by the Thirteenth Amendment.199
In a Thirteenth Amendment argument, outlining the historical
connection of sexual violence against Black women to slavery incorporates the background needed for a cohesive front in the mold of Jones.200
The alternative, or perhaps supplemental, statutory argument for a violation of the rights included in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should focus on the
section covering “security of the person,” making the point that Black
women have fundamentally been denied access to safety and autonomy
because of the high incidence of sexual violence.201 These arguments
grant a method of restitution for the plight Black women face regarding
these crimes.202 By introducing legal arguments grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment, attorneys, judges, and legislators will realize the potential for the Amendment to resolve vestiges of slavery. Through persistent application, the Thirteenth Amendment argument can change the
minds of those who currently feel its sole purpose was to abolish slavery.203
With the confirmations of Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh,205 our nation’s highest court may not
have the political ideology that would favor a broad interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, an alternative option remains.
Congress has the power to pass laws under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment206 and should exercise that power by passing legislation that specifically targets the problem that Black women face. In so doing, Congress would not only establish concrete protection for Black women in
the form of a statute addressing the under-enforcement of these
crimes,207 it would also send a message to Black women that this is an
204
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issue that our government takes seriously enough to warrant unique legislation. This message may increase the confidence Black women have
in our criminal justice system,208 leading to increased reporting and improved statistics. Congressional action has a better chance of succeeding
than cases tried in front of the Supreme Court regarding unequal treatment, especially given the fact that the 2018 mid-term elections resulted
in Democratic capture of the House of Representatives.209 Further, there
has been an increased focus on male sexual violence against women
since President Trump’s election.210 If activists are able to capitalize on
this political moment, legislation designed to provide Black women
with additional protections could succeed in Congress. Solidifying legislative support in Congress for the fair treatment of sexual assault cases
of Black women would prove more fruitful than trying to push cases up
to the Supreme Court.211
B. Civil Tort Remedies
Black women can use civil tort actions to deter sexual violence
while simultaneously providing themselves with a viable means of redress. Black women could sue perpetrators of sexual assault for traditional torts like assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and potentially false imprisonment. While no particular legal
remedy can make a sexual assault survivor whole after their experience,
civil tort actions can provide a victim with a more viable option than the
current criminal system.212

See Taslitz, supra note 30, at 1190 (noting that 65.8% of blacks had “little confidence” that
police treat blacks and whites equally).
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211 Hopkins, supra note 209.
212 See Leigh Goodmark, “Law and Justice Are Not Always the Same”: Creating CommunityBased Justice Forums for People Subjected to Intimate Partner Abuse, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
707, 718 (2015) (“People subjected to abuse cannot expect to have their experiences validated
by the criminal justice system.”) (discussing the problems with a criminal justice model in the
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The criminal system presents several problems to victims who
are interested in their own individual view of justice.213 The civil system
also would allow sexual assault survivors more control over their cases,
whereas the criminal system can sometimes force victims to testify
against their will in the context of crimes committed against the state.214
Sexual assault survivors do not necessarily wish to go through the traditional criminal system, which many view as not representative of their
own interests.215 The civil system presents a more individualistic response,216 wherein victims can choose whether to move forward in filing a complaint as well as the direction that their case should take.
A potential problem with the civil system alternative is that not
all perpetrators can pay the damages awarded to the victim, which can
limit the potential appeal for a civil attorney to take a sexual assault case.
In order for this option to be viable, lawyers would need to act in part
as an activist, individually devoted to enacting social change through
cases that may or may not lead to large awards for damages. In the past,
lawyers who have been interested in enacting new rape laws and developing new codes have not necessarily translated into a cohesive “public
interest bar” on sexual assault issues.217 Attorneys that work on these
civil cases should be interested in how they can create social change
while simultaneously helping the individual survivor recover from the
trauma of assault.
CONCLUSION
Black women suffer from sexual violence at a higher rate than
White women218 because of centuries-old racist biases stemming from
the institution of slavery, and the United States continues to ignore
their struggle. The 34th Congress anticipated the numerous injustices
that would outlast emancipation and passed the Thirteenth Amendment
213
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as an alternative to traditional criminal justice systems).
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216 See Goodmark, supra note 212, at 727 (“Confining people subjected to abuse to one vision
of justice is disempowering.”).
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(NYU Press, 2013).
218 PLANTY ET AL., supra note 88; CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 194530,
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000 2
(2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf.
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and the 1866 Civil Rights Act with the intention of empowering
Congress to enact further legislation to protect Black people.219 The
disparate treatment of Black women subjected to sexual violence
remains unresolved generations after abolition220 and requires direct
action. Utilizing the Thirteenth Amendment to its true post-Jones
potential221 would force the criminal justice system to make the
necessary changes to provide Black women with the security they have
long been promised.
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